It would be interesting to see such experiments take place but as long as premiere closers are commnading huge salaries based on saves, you will not see such a closer brought into the game in the 6th or 7th inning. There's too much money at stake in the current structure for it to be replced. Boopotts puts forth an interesting concept when he proposes bringing in the best reliever (or former closer like Hoffman) first, as it is usually set up exactly opposite now, as the reliever with the most explosive stuff usually fulfills the closer's role. Of course, that can change too over the course of the season, as the position of closer (with obvious exceptions like Rivera and Rodriguez and Hoffman) is one of the most tenuous on the team.
Collecting 1970s Topps baseball wax, rack and cello packs, as well as PCGS graded Half Cents, Large Cents, Two Cent pieces and Three Cent Silver pieces.
<< <i>It would be interesting to see such experiments take place but as long as premiere closers are commnading huge salaries based on saves, you will not see such a closer brought into the game in the 6th or 7th inning. There's too much money at stake in the current structure for it to be replced. Boopotts puts forth an interesting concept when he proposes bringing in the best reliever (or former closer like Hoffman) first, as it is usually set up exactly opposite now, as the reliever with the most explosive stuff usually fulfills the closer's role. Of course, that can change too over the course of the season, as the position of closer (with obvious exceptions like Rivera and Rodriguez and Hoffman) is one of the most tenuous on the team. >>
I agree-- it's never going to happen. But it SHOULD happen. In any case, I know that there's no way I would ever pay someone like K-Rod $15 million a year to pitch 70 innings, when for probably about 65 of those innings any scrub from the bullpen would have achieved the same result. For that kind of money I would insist that you be prepared to pitch at any time in the game, and that you also be prepared to log 150 innings a year. If that doesn't work for you then you can find some team of suckers (like the Tigers) to pay you eight figures a year.
The players union and the agents basically run the game of baseball now and no manager or GM has the balls to break tradition and risk upsetting the status quo. That is a shame.
Collecting 1970s Topps baseball wax, rack and cello packs, as well as PCGS graded Half Cents, Large Cents, Two Cent pieces and Three Cent Silver pieces.
<< <i>The players union and the agents basically run the game of baseball now and no manager or GM has the balls to break tradition and risk upsetting the status quo. That is a shame. >>
I think you're dead on. Billy Beane more or less said as much in a recent interview. He knows-- as do others-- that the whole notion of using your best relief pitcher for fewer innings than your scrubs is probably not an optimal way to organize your bullpen, but all hell would break loose if he (or anyone else) began to manage their bullpen correctly.
And I can certainly sympathize with him. Since so many teams rely heavily on the gate for revenue you really can't afford to P.O. the fans, because you're in deep trouble if they quit showing up. And they will quit showing up-- or at least there's a risk of it-- if you begin putting Papelbon in the game in the seventh inning when the game is 2-2, then bringing in a gas can in the 9th who blows it.
So, I can see why baseball teams have to settle for sub-optimal strategies. But I can not understand why this happens in the NFL. The horrible decisions that NFL coaches routinely make-- particularly when it comes to going for two points, or going (actually not going) on fourth down--continually baffles me. Some owner should just tell his coach to make the correct call, and that he'll support him if it goes wrong and the home town fans crucify him. This alone would probably garner an average team somewhere between another 1.25 and 2 wins a year, which of course in the NFL is just a huge improvement.
But I can not understand why this happens in the NFL. The horrible decisions that NFL coaches routinely make-- particularly when it comes to going for two points,
On that note, I'm wondering what your take was on Shanahan's deciding to go for 2 at the end of the SD-Den game? I'm not sure how I feel about that decision--it certainly was a gutsy call you're more apt to see in college than in the NFL--but I'm curious what you thought of it at the time. In hindsight, of course, it was a brilliant move in a seesaw game.
Collecting 1970s Topps baseball wax, rack and cello packs, as well as PCGS graded Half Cents, Large Cents, Two Cent pieces and Three Cent Silver pieces.
<< <i>But I can not understand why this happens in the NFL. The horrible decisions that NFL coaches routinely make-- particularly when it comes to going for two points,
On that note, I'm wondering what your take was on Shanahan's deciding to go for 2 at the end of the SD-Den game? I'm not sure how I feel about that decision--it certainly was a gutsy call you're more apt to see in college than in the NFL--but I'm curious what you thought of it at the time. In hindsight, of course, it was a brilliant move in a seesaw game. >>
I don't really know either. I 'think' you make it about 40% of the time, so it really comes down to what your chances are of winning in OT. Are they better than 40% or so? My thinking is that Den would have been better off going into OT, since I can't see SD being -150 in overtime, but it's hard to know for sure.
I do know that if you're a heavy dog then you should always go for two in that spot, and if you're a heavy fave then it makes no sense whatsoever. But I don't know what the cut-off is for that decision.
According to Bill James: Using a bullpen ace to protect a two-run lead is less effective than using him when behind by one run. Each run saved in a tie game has EIGHT times the impact of a run saved with a three-run lead. The ultimate inefficient use of your relief ace would be to leave him on the bench in the eighth inning of a tie game you end up losing, then, the next night bring him in to save a three-run lead.
Contrary to public opinion the 2003 Boston Red Sox did not use a bullpen by committee. They had Ugeuth Urbina as their closer in 2002 at a cost of around 9 million. They felt they could replace Urbina equally well spending far less money. What went wrong was that the Sox tried to save money and guessed wrong on some relief pitchers. The idea was to get the most out of their ace reliever, not to leave it hanging who the ace reliever was.
The salary issue is pretty interesting. Mariano Rivera signed his first big contract in his prime. It was less than Darren Dreifort and Chan Ho Park signed around the same time
In the 50s (and earlier) a lot of managers did want a relief ace. The problem was that no starter would accept a position because it was certain it would lead to a pay cut. Players only choice was to either sign what management offered or sit out. And management would use anything possible to not offer a raise
What I remember is it wasn't the Red Sox who claimed to be using a bullpen by committee, it the media who created the entire thing. Looking back, it seems like it was an open tryout that lasted through spring training and into April. While I remember them blowing a few three run leads, the four pitchers they tried actually did have some talent. My guess is it was a combination of coincidence, perception and lack of time that none of them were able to emerged as a relief ace
<< <i>if you begin putting Papelbon in the game in the seventh inning when the game is 2-2, then bringing in a gas can in the 9th who blows it. >>
But saving Papelbon for the ninth has to be the correct choice. If you have to use the weaker pitcher at some point, why wouldn't you turn to him first and then be able to save Papelbon for another day if either team scores a few runs?
<< <i>The salary issue is pretty interesting. Mariano Rivera signed his first big contract in his prime. It was less than Darren Dreifort and Chan Ho Park signed around the same time
In the 50s (and earlier) a lot of managers did want a relief ace. The problem was that no starter would accept a position because it was certain it would lead to a pay cut. Players only choice was to either sign what management offered or sit out. And management would use anything possible to not offer a raise
What I remember is it wasn't the Red Sox who claimed to be using a bullpen by committee, it the media who created the entire thing. Looking back, it seems like it was an open tryout that lasted through spring training and into April. While I remember them blowing a few three run leads, the four pitchers they tried actually did have some talent. My guess is it was a combination of coincidence, perception and lack of time that none of them were able to emerged as a relief ace
<< <i>if you begin putting Papelbon in the game in the seventh inning when the game is 2-2, then bringing in a gas can in the 9th who blows it. >>
But saving Papelbon for the ninth has to be the correct choice. If you have to use the weaker pitcher at some point, why wouldn't you turn to him first and then be able to save Papelbon for another day if either team scores a few runs? >>
But you may not have to use the weaker pitcher later on in a situation that matters. Either your team (hopefully) or the other team might jump out to a three run lead by the ninth inning, at which point it won't matter who you put on the bump-- unless, of course, you put Fernando Rodney out there (private joke there amongst Tiger fans).
I think you're 100% correct that if you knew, somehow, that the game would still be tied in the ninth then you would rather save your best arm until them. Also, I'm not factoring in the fatigue issue. I'm sure there's a way to account for that, but I don't know what it is off the top of my head. My guess is that it would involve searching the betting archives for games where the posted odds were similar to those which will be posted for your game tomorrow, and then cross referencing this list with the corresponding box scores to see how often you will be in a 1 or 2 run game past the sixth inning when your starter is not on the mound. From here you can probably work out the expected value (in terms of win equity) of putting your stud in the game now versus the EV of holding off.
<< <i>But saving Papelbon for the ninth has to be the correct choice. If you have to use the weaker pitcher at some point, why wouldn't you turn to him first and then be able to save Papelbon for another day if either team scores a few runs? >>
It might be, but it doesn't have to be. The issue is that if you put Papelbon in in the 7th in close games you will enter the ninth with a lead much more often than if you put a weaker pitcher in in that situation. If you put in the weaker pitcher in first, and he doesn't do as well as Papelbon (which will happen many, many times over the course of a season, then much of the time Papelbon will never even get into the game - a game that was very winnable as late as the seventh inning.
I would say that putting Papelbon in at the point that maximizes his likely impact on the game - and there is no situation more likely than a tied game in the 6th or 7 - has to be the correct choice. Waiting until the 9th practically guarantees he will pitch no more than one inning and putting him in earlier always gives you at least the option to have him face more hitters if he's doing well. I would never, ever put him in in the 9th with a two or three run lead even though those are "save" opportunities - much better to save his arm for situations that aren't already 90%+ likely to be wins no matter who I put in. If you don't have another relief pitcher capable of pitching one inning without giving up two or more runs at least 90% of the time, then your team isn't going to win many games no matter what you do.
This is for you @thisistheshow - Jim Rice was actually a pretty good player.
Either your team (hopefully) or the other team might jump out to a three run lead by the ninth inning, at which point it won't matter who you put on the bump--
But many blown saves turn out to be wins anyway. The Mets are 76-7 when entering the ninth with a lead (92%) and 71-13 when entering the 7th with a lead (85%). And that's with a bullpen, other than Wagner, that has been among the worst in the league. The Phillies are 75-0 with a lead going into the ninth, which is obviously rare and obviously part luck, but they're about the same entering the 7th with a lead at 61-10 (86%). The big difference is when the teams are tied: the Mets are 5-14 entering the 7th tied, the Phillies are 14-9.
Why is the Phillies record in the ninth "lucky"? The Phillies allow .42 runs on average in the ninth inning, the Mets allow .48. You'd expect an extra couple wins but not an extra 7; the difference in their records is mostly things having nothing to do with their "closers". Any team is going to win 90%+ with a lead in the ninth as long as their pitching is major league caliber. The bigger difference is the runs the two teams allow in the seventh inning, not the ninth; the Phillies come in at .33 and the Mets at .55. The Phillies leads grow in the seventh and eighth innings, while the Mets leads shrink; the Phillies enter the ninth with bigger leads and so holding a ninth inning lead for the Phillies is much easier than holding the smaller leads of the Mets. No matter who is pitching.
The Cardinals, with all their bullpen woes? 69-6 entering the ninth with a lead, 64-17 entering the seventh. Lowly Washington with 28 saves among the entire staff? 48-1 and 41-8. Houston, the team with the saves leader? 70-3 and 58-8. Los Angeles, a mediocre team with no true closer? 67-4 and 61-10. How about San Diego where Hoffman's ERA is more than a full run higher than his career average? 51-2 and 46-13. What you'll notice is an enormous difference in how often teams enter these innings with a lead, mostly random noise after that, and only the top one or two closers standing out (although you'd think Washington had one, too).
The fact is if I were to pick a random season and show you nothing but each team's W/L percentages entering the seventh and ninth innings with a lead, you might be about 75% correct picking out the teams with the top two closers in each league (or you might not), but you might as well flip a coin to guess the quality of the closers on the rest of the teams - their records will all be within a few games of each other. The advantage a team has by virtue of entering the ninth with a lead dwarfs all other factors; the differences in each team's hitting and pitching past that point makes up the rest, but if you can spend your money either on a starter who will get you to the ninth with a lead, a hitter who will make that lead bigger, or a reliever who will hold that lead, never use that money on the reliever.
Closer is a BS position.
This is for you @thisistheshow - Jim Rice was actually a pretty good player.
Comments
Collecting 1970s Topps baseball wax, rack and cello packs, as well as PCGS graded Half Cents, Large Cents, Two Cent pieces and Three Cent Silver pieces.
<< <i>It would be interesting to see such experiments take place but as long as premiere closers are commnading huge salaries based on saves, you will not see such a closer brought into the game in the 6th or 7th inning. There's too much money at stake in the current structure for it to be replced. Boopotts puts forth an interesting concept when he proposes bringing in the best reliever (or former closer like Hoffman) first, as it is usually set up exactly opposite now, as the reliever with the most explosive stuff usually fulfills the closer's role. Of course, that can change too over the course of the season, as the position of closer (with obvious exceptions like Rivera and Rodriguez and Hoffman) is one of the most tenuous on the team. >>
I agree-- it's never going to happen. But it SHOULD happen. In any case, I know that there's no way I would ever pay someone like K-Rod $15 million a year to pitch 70 innings, when for probably about 65 of those innings any scrub from the bullpen would have achieved the same result. For that kind of money I would insist that you be prepared to pitch at any time in the game, and that you also be prepared to log 150 innings a year. If that doesn't work for you then you can find some team of suckers (like the Tigers) to pay you eight figures a year.
Collecting 1970s Topps baseball wax, rack and cello packs, as well as PCGS graded Half Cents, Large Cents, Two Cent pieces and Three Cent Silver pieces.
<< <i>The players union and the agents basically run the game of baseball now and no manager or GM has the balls to break tradition and risk upsetting the status quo. That is a shame. >>
I think you're dead on. Billy Beane more or less said as much in a recent interview. He knows-- as do others-- that the whole notion of using your best relief pitcher for fewer innings than your scrubs is probably not an optimal way to organize your bullpen, but all hell would break loose if he (or anyone else) began to manage their bullpen correctly.
And I can certainly sympathize with him. Since so many teams rely heavily on the gate for revenue you really can't afford to P.O. the fans, because you're in deep trouble if they quit showing up. And they will quit showing up-- or at least there's a risk of it-- if you begin putting Papelbon in the game in the seventh inning when the game is 2-2, then bringing in a gas can in the 9th who blows it.
So, I can see why baseball teams have to settle for sub-optimal strategies. But I can not understand why this happens in the NFL. The horrible decisions that NFL coaches routinely make-- particularly when it comes to going for two points, or going (actually not going) on fourth down--continually baffles me. Some owner should just tell his coach to make the correct call, and that he'll support him if it goes wrong and the home town fans crucify him. This alone would probably garner an average team somewhere between another 1.25 and 2 wins a year, which of course in the NFL is just a huge improvement.
On that note, I'm wondering what your take was on Shanahan's deciding to go for 2 at the end of the SD-Den game? I'm not sure how I feel about that decision--it certainly was a gutsy call you're more apt to see in college than in the NFL--but I'm curious what you thought of it at the time. In hindsight, of course, it was a brilliant move in a seesaw game.
Collecting 1970s Topps baseball wax, rack and cello packs, as well as PCGS graded Half Cents, Large Cents, Two Cent pieces and Three Cent Silver pieces.
<< <i>But I can not understand why this happens in the NFL. The horrible decisions that NFL coaches routinely make-- particularly when it comes to going for two points,
On that note, I'm wondering what your take was on Shanahan's deciding to go for 2 at the end of the SD-Den game? I'm not sure how I feel about that decision--it certainly was a gutsy call you're more apt to see in college than in the NFL--but I'm curious what you thought of it at the time. In hindsight, of course, it was a brilliant move in a seesaw game. >>
I don't really know either. I 'think' you make it about 40% of the time, so it really comes down to what your chances are of winning in OT. Are they better than 40% or so? My thinking is that Den would have been better off going into OT, since I can't see SD being -150 in overtime, but it's hard to know for sure.
I do know that if you're a heavy dog then you should always go for two in that spot, and if you're a heavy fave then it makes no sense whatsoever. But I don't know what the cut-off is for that decision.
up game winning 3 run homers.
Steve
Using a bullpen ace to protect a two-run lead is less effective than using him when behind by one run.
Each run saved in a tie game has EIGHT times the impact of a run saved with a three-run lead.
The ultimate inefficient use of your relief ace would be to leave him on the bench in the eighth inning of a tie game you end up losing, then, the next night bring him in to save a three-run lead.
Contrary to public opinion the 2003 Boston Red Sox did not use a bullpen by committee. They had Ugeuth Urbina as their closer in 2002 at a cost of around 9 million. They felt they could replace Urbina equally well spending far less money. What went wrong was that the Sox tried to save money and guessed wrong on some relief pitchers. The idea was to get the most out of their ace reliever, not to leave it hanging who the ace reliever was.
In the 50s (and earlier) a lot of managers did want a relief ace. The problem was that no starter would accept a position because it was certain it would lead to a pay cut. Players only choice was to either sign what management offered or sit out. And management would use anything possible to not offer a raise
What I remember is it wasn't the Red Sox who claimed to be using a bullpen by committee, it the media who created the entire thing. Looking back, it seems like it was an open tryout that lasted through spring training and into April. While I remember them blowing a few three run leads, the four pitchers they tried actually did have some talent. My guess is it was a combination of coincidence, perception and lack of time that none of them were able to emerged as a relief ace
<< <i>if you begin putting Papelbon in the game in the seventh inning when the game is 2-2, then bringing in a gas can in the 9th who blows it. >>
But saving Papelbon for the ninth has to be the correct choice. If you have to use the weaker pitcher at some point, why wouldn't you turn to him first and then be able to save Papelbon for another day if either team scores a few runs?
<< <i>The salary issue is pretty interesting. Mariano Rivera signed his first big contract in his prime. It was less than Darren Dreifort and Chan Ho Park signed around the same time
In the 50s (and earlier) a lot of managers did want a relief ace. The problem was that no starter would accept a position because it was certain it would lead to a pay cut. Players only choice was to either sign what management offered or sit out. And management would use anything possible to not offer a raise
What I remember is it wasn't the Red Sox who claimed to be using a bullpen by committee, it the media who created the entire thing. Looking back, it seems like it was an open tryout that lasted through spring training and into April. While I remember them blowing a few three run leads, the four pitchers they tried actually did have some talent. My guess is it was a combination of coincidence, perception and lack of time that none of them were able to emerged as a relief ace
<< <i>if you begin putting Papelbon in the game in the seventh inning when the game is 2-2, then bringing in a gas can in the 9th who blows it. >>
But saving Papelbon for the ninth has to be the correct choice. If you have to use the weaker pitcher at some point, why wouldn't you turn to him first and then be able to save Papelbon for another day if either team scores a few runs? >>
But you may not have to use the weaker pitcher later on in a situation that matters. Either your team (hopefully) or the other team might jump out to a three run lead by the ninth inning, at which point it won't matter who you put on the bump-- unless, of course, you put Fernando Rodney out there (private joke there amongst Tiger fans).
I think you're 100% correct that if you knew, somehow, that the game would still be tied in the ninth then you would rather save your best arm until them. Also, I'm not factoring in the fatigue issue. I'm sure there's a way to account for that, but I don't know what it is off the top of my head. My guess is that it would involve searching the betting archives for games where the posted odds were similar to those which will be posted for your game tomorrow, and then cross referencing this list with the corresponding box scores to see how often you will be in a 1 or 2 run game past the sixth inning when your starter is not on the mound. From here you can probably work out the expected value (in terms of win equity) of putting your stud in the game now versus the EV of holding off.
<< <i>But saving Papelbon for the ninth has to be the correct choice. If you have to use the weaker pitcher at some point, why wouldn't you turn to him first and then be able to save Papelbon for another day if either team scores a few runs? >>
It might be, but it doesn't have to be. The issue is that if you put Papelbon in in the 7th in close games you will enter the ninth with a lead much more often than if you put a weaker pitcher in in that situation. If you put in the weaker pitcher in first, and he doesn't do as well as Papelbon (which will happen many, many times over the course of a season, then much of the time Papelbon will never even get into the game - a game that was very winnable as late as the seventh inning.
I would say that putting Papelbon in at the point that maximizes his likely impact on the game - and there is no situation more likely than a tied game in the 6th or 7 - has to be the correct choice. Waiting until the 9th practically guarantees he will pitch no more than one inning and putting him in earlier always gives you at least the option to have him face more hitters if he's doing well. I would never, ever put him in in the 9th with a two or three run lead even though those are "save" opportunities - much better to save his arm for situations that aren't already 90%+ likely to be wins no matter who I put in. If you don't have another relief pitcher capable of pitching one inning without giving up two or more runs at least 90% of the time, then your team isn't going to win many games no matter what you do.
Right now I'd take 50% of the time!
Not sure of the exact pct, but the Mets have blown 29 saves this year.
Steve
A 5 run lead is not even safe in Mets ville.
Steve
Why is the Phillies record in the ninth "lucky"? The Phillies allow .42 runs on average in the ninth inning, the Mets allow .48. You'd expect an extra couple wins but not an extra 7; the difference in their records is mostly things having nothing to do with their "closers". Any team is going to win 90%+ with a lead in the ninth as long as their pitching is major league caliber. The bigger difference is the runs the two teams allow in the seventh inning, not the ninth; the Phillies come in at .33 and the Mets at .55. The Phillies leads grow in the seventh and eighth innings, while the Mets leads shrink; the Phillies enter the ninth with bigger leads and so holding a ninth inning lead for the Phillies is much easier than holding the smaller leads of the Mets. No matter who is pitching.
The Cardinals, with all their bullpen woes? 69-6 entering the ninth with a lead, 64-17 entering the seventh. Lowly Washington with 28 saves among the entire staff? 48-1 and 41-8. Houston, the team with the saves leader? 70-3 and 58-8. Los Angeles, a mediocre team with no true closer? 67-4 and 61-10. How about San Diego where Hoffman's ERA is more than a full run higher than his career average? 51-2 and 46-13. What you'll notice is an enormous difference in how often teams enter these innings with a lead, mostly random noise after that, and only the top one or two closers standing out (although you'd think Washington had one, too).
The fact is if I were to pick a random season and show you nothing but each team's W/L percentages entering the seventh and ninth innings with a lead, you might be about 75% correct picking out the teams with the top two closers in each league (or you might not), but you might as well flip a coin to guess the quality of the closers on the rest of the teams - their records will all be within a few games of each other. The advantage a team has by virtue of entering the ninth with a lead dwarfs all other factors; the differences in each team's hitting and pitching past that point makes up the rest, but if you can spend your money either on a starter who will get you to the ninth with a lead, a hitter who will make that lead bigger, or a reliever who will hold that lead, never use that money on the reliever.
Closer is a BS position.
<< <i>Closer is a BS position. >>
Then grab a shovel and learn to deal with it, because the BS position is here to stay.
WTB: 2001 Leaf Rookies & Stars Longevity: Ryan Jensen #/25