MVP case study, Men on Hitting, Lineup protection

Skinpinch

We had a talk about the value of men on hitting, and among other things Lineup protection. This was all related to an MVP debate about ARod, and Big papi. This is classic NY vs. Bos, so bias no doubt entered the picture on those fans minds. Well, I chose an MVP case study where I feel the voters missed. I chose this as it reduces bias because both players were from the same team, the Men on Hitting was contrasted largely, and the lineup protection played a role in what I believe is one of the single most amazing stats for an MVP to have.

The case of Eddie Murray vs. Cal Ripken, 1983 Orioles.

Facts: Ripken won 322 votes to 90. Ripken hit .318, Ob% .371, SLG% .518
........................................................Murray hit . 306, OB% .393, SLG% .538
Ripken batted 3rd, and Murray 4th.

Just by looking at those numbers, Murray has an edge, but the edge is erased by defensive contributions, so Ripken on the surface should be the winner. But baseball is a game of situations, and with each situation, the importance of hits take on different values. It is what Murray did with men on that truly defined what each of their accomplishments towards their team was.

Men on base hitting....
Ripken .300, .360, .502
Murray. 338, .433, .596

Obviously Murray has a large edge, but how much? Thanks to the play by play analysis, it was possible to determine the value of each hitting event in each base and out situation. To shorten this up, I lumped them together into the average, instead of listing every hit.
For example, the average 1B with nobody on was worth .29 runs, with Runners on base (ROB) it was worth .73 runs. Here is the list of what each hitting event is worth with the bases empty and with runners on. These numbers also change depending on park, and era(these numbers here won't work cross-era).


........................1B.....2B.....3B.....HR......BB.......out
NOBODY ON==.29==.49==.68==1===.29====-.20
RUnners ON==.73==1.14=1.49=1.93--.42=====-.42

Next, I plugged into the numbers of each Ripken and Murray and what they did in each of those instances. The total is known as Batter Runs (BR).

Ripken earned 25 BR
Murray earned 39 BR

Next I added the value of SB, CS, and GIDP, to bring their total offensive contribution of Batter Runs to:

RIpken 16 BR
Murray 37 BR

Murray clearly dominated Ripken in offesnive contribtions to the 1983 Orioles. Defensive contributions are always sticky, and in this particular year Ripken was given one of his highest defensive contributions, and Murray one of his lower ones. Ripken, on the HIGH END of the defensive contribtions was +10 runs more than Murray(at their positions), which is generous. I then included that into the batter runs.

So that now closes the gap to:

Ripken 26 BR
Murray 37 BR

So right now, with offense and even Ripken's inflated defense taken into account, Murray is the MVP of the two. But we are not done!

Lineup protection! Eddie Murray was simply the most feared hitter in the league, the stats show it, and the pitchers also voted on it. Nobody wanted to face him with men on.

When you look at the at bats with Runners in Scoring Position, you notice that Ripken got 170 such at bats, and Murray only 129. A few things account for this 1)chance, 2)Murray missed six games and batted one spot lower in the lineup, and 3) Lineup protection and pitching around Murray.

Regardless of which of those is at work, how good would Murray's Batter Runs be if he got those extra 41 at bats with RISP that Ripken got? It would only be fair to equalize the number of chances each had with MEN ON and RISP. Consider how good Murray was with men on and RISP, and just think if there was a hitter that was as good as Murray batting fifth. The pitchers would have had to pitch to Murray more in those situations, which means more, 2B, HR, and ultimately more BR for Murray! Then considering those are the highest valued times to get a hit, Murray most likely would have separated from Ripken another 7 BR if their chances were equalized as they should be.

So basically, with the chances now equalized and neutral, Murray goes up 43 to 26.

But what about overall lineup protection? Forget the above example of where it comes into play, but what about in every at bat? Does lineup protection exist? Most observers say yes, most analysists say barely, but only in the midst of the the very best behind you. Murray qualifies in this case. I don't have an estimation on the effect of runs in this case.

The single most amazing stat? Well, Cal Ripken in 1983 was an MVP and did it with a great offesnive season. He also had a decent double play candidate batting behind him. YET, in 162 games Cal Ripken did NOT receive a single INTENTIONAL WALK!! In fact, for a four year stretch, while Eddie Murray was batting behind Ripken, Ripken did not receive a single intetinal walk in that span!! Now, if Murray had Eddie Murray batting behind him....lots omore hits with men on for Murray.

In conclusion, when counting the overall performance, which includes men on hitting, and when adding an inflated defensive value for Ripken, Murray was the most valuable, or the BEST of the two players for the 1983 Orioles. When you equalize the RISP chances and consider the lineup protection that Murray provided but did not get himself, it should have been a clear MVP victory for Murray, yet that did not happen. I never looked at the Late Inning hitting in which Murray excelled at either.

jaxxr

In 1983 the "Ironman" of course played in more games than Murray, so probably contributed a bit more in the games Eddie never participated in.

His BA and hits were higher, he scored more runs, had more total bases, produced more runs ( RBI + RUNS minus HRS or as some prefer minus HRS twice), was a more heralded fieldler at much more noticable position regarding defense contribution.

Not to mention his relations with the media were much better ( see Ted Williams triple crown no MVP), seems a reasonable choice for a champion team.

dallasactuary

Excellent analysis, thanks for taking the time and sharing.

One small quibble: the last step you take where you "normalize" the RISP at bats I don't think can be entirely justified. First, because it gives Murray credit for ABs in games in which he didn't even play (sort of like giving Ted Williams the MVP in 1953, which is the result you'd get if you applied the same process), and second because many of those "missing" ABs are walks, and you already gave him credit for those walks in step 1.

But, even without the last step, you make a compelling case for Murray. If you ever find the time to do the same analysis for Sosa vs. McGwire - my Cardinal-biased pick for the most dubious recent MVP selection - I would love to see it.

Skinpinch

Jaxx, the reasons you cited are the reasons why he actually won the award, which I was showing are incorrect reasons. The reasons I showed are the contributions they actually made. I recognize the position advantage and that closes the gap more, and I was trying to underscore the importance of Murray batting behind Ripken. I ignored the late/close in which Murray excelled in too. This case really doesn't belong with some real miscarriages of justice, but it highlights some of the things to consider that usually aren't.

Dallas, you are correct in citing that. Six games missed is equivalent on average to 7.2 more at bats with RISP(I did recognize that and stated that as one of the reasons why he had less). Those men on base numbers I cited include runner on 1B. When only runners in scoring position are looked at, the hits take on more value, and that is the area Ripken had more at bats in(more opportunities to do greater damage). My factual estimation may be off by a few runs. Though Murray didn't have the luxury of having a Murray behind him, so if he was allowed to hit in those situations, then he could do more damage than just walking. That is where the few extra runs came from, admittedly an estimation not based on pure fact. Knowing Ripken was never intentionally walked, and that Murray was, Ripken had more second and third type at bats.

I believe McGwire wins that Sosa battle. Because the Cubs won the division is the reason why Sosa won the award, not because he was better than McGwire.

MajorDanby

<< <i>I believe McGwire wins that Sosa battle. Because the Cubs won the division is the reason why Sosa won the award, not because he was better than McGwire >>



In other words, your analysis is for races that a.) have two players on playoff teams or (and a much clearer and more transparent analysis) b.) have two players on the same team that went to the playoff (as in your murray vs ripken example).

Explain why you added 10 BR's to ripken's total to account for defense? How did you get that number? Did you take into account balls hit ripken's way when men were in scoring position? double plays turned by ripken? Calculating a BR number as you did with offense is a bit harder to do with defense.

Skinpinch

The defense are fielding runs above average player at position. I just incorporated them into the batter runs to have one total. Those are from a fielding measurement that was used a few years back when I looked at all these numbers. Fielding measures aren't as concrete as batting measures, and it accounts for all the DP's etc... Ripken's defensive numbers benefitted a bit from having a pitching staff that ranked in the lower half of strikeouts, and from a few good ground ball pitchers on the staff. That meant more balls hit in play to give Ripken an advantage over the average shortstop in the league, so his defensive value is pushed a little higher than it truly is. The league average shortstop if put into Ripken's place would have better looking numbers because he too would have extra plays. Itmeans more PO, and Asissts, and DP's. All those greatly enhance the value over the few extra errors it causes.

The extra plays don't benefit the 1B as much as his value in defensive measurements derives almost purely from assists and errors. He doesn't get credit for put outs in the standard defensive measurement. So the extra batted balls give him more error chances, and he only has assists to cancel them out. First base assists are not as frequent as other positions. The extra batted balls hit go proportinately higher to the middle infield. Ripken would get credit for the assist on a throw to Murray, and Murray's contribution is ignored(most of the time it is routine, but it isn't always). But if Murray makes an error on the throw, it isn't ignored. It doens't account for Murray 'picks' either. None of the fielding measures used account for 'picks' by a first basemen, and that is a largely ignored area that has significance in baseball. Pick meaning scoops of bad throws. The only measure of a first baseman's ability to do that is that of the eyeball, and Murray was good wtih the glove in that area, better than average, so I didn't account for that either. So the numbers used don't even take that into account.

My analysis was to cut through all that winning team and bias stuff, and figure what was really at work. Murray and Ripken eliminates all the arguing that usually goes on between debates like this, as they are from the same team. It eliminates the Ny or Bos bias that rages in Ortiz vs. Arod, that always seems to get in the way of any discussion It eliminates the same bias of Sosa vs. McGwire.

DeutscherGeist

Nice analysis Skinpinch!

You can do the same with Mattingly and Henderson in 1985. Both on the same team, both just as worthy. I saw one guy do his own analysis to prove that Henderson should have actually won the MVP. I forgot all the variables he used and what numbers he took into account. No two analysis are going to be identical or give the same result either.